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                                                                 Abstract 
The objective of this paper is to study the interactions between Economic liberalisation, Political 
liberalisation and Financial development in African countries. More specifically, we seek to 
establish the impact of Economic, Political and institutional openness on financial deepening. The 
empirical approach will be two-step procedure, first  using  a difference in difference method to 
show the various aspect of financial liberalisation on economic and political freedom while the 
second step will be using panel data techniques from period 1990 to 2005. The estimation results 
can be summarised as the following, first, Economic and financial  liberalisation  did account 
significantly for the financial development performance.  While political stability show a positive 
overall effect on financial development, the association with Political freedom  is consistent only 
after controlling the endogeneity of  Political freedom on financial development.  This result 
indicates that the transformation of the political and economic environment has improved the 
performance of the financial sector. 
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1. Introduction. 
Economic theory and experience suggests that financial development has a positive impact on long 
term economic growth (see Levine et al. 2000; Levine 2003; Bekaert et al 2001; Minier, 2003; 
Christopoulos and Tsionas, 2004; and  Demetrides and Andrinova ,2004). The argument goes back 
to Schumpeter (1912) who argued that the services provided by financial intermediaries were 
essential were essential for innovation and development. Levine (1997) list of five functions of the 
financial system by which it enhances economic growth: (i) reducing risk; (ii) allocating resources; 
(iii) monitoring managers and exerting corporate control; (iv) mobilising savings; and (v) 
facilitating exchange of goods and services. The better the financial system performs these 
functions, the more it contribute to overall economic growth. However, while all financial systems 
provide these financial functions, there are large differences in how well they are provided.  
In the 1970s, Shaw (1973) and Mckinnon (1973) emphasized the problem of financial repression in 
developing countries, arguing that in an economy in which the government directly influences the 
credit policy of banks and sets the ceilings on interest rates, the result is a fall in aggregate savings and 
investments and inefficient distribution of financial resources. They pointed out that financial repression 
resulted in sub-optimal macroeconomic performance and a choice for less favourable development 
prospects. On the other hand, financial liberalisation would raise the level of aggregate savings and 
foster a more efficient distribution and use of financial resources as preconditions for creating a 
sustainable basis for the economic growth and development. 
On the advice of international financial and development agencies many African countries 
undertook financial liberalization as part of overall macroeconomic reforms in the 1980s and 1990s 
(see Aryeetey, 1994; Collier, 1990; Ekpenyong, 1994; and Oshikoya, 1994. Kasekende and Atingi-
Ego, 1999; and, Reinhart et. al. 2000). Overall, while the reforms succeeded in easing financial 
repression, the impact on increasing growth and investment has been patchy while African financial 
systems remain shallow and relatively underdeveloped. Instead liberalization appeared to engender 
greater instability and crises, particularly in the banking sector (Dermiguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 
1999).In this paper we return to these questions by examining the impact of economic and financial 
liberalization on financial development in Africa. In particular, we examine whether 
democratization can induce a country to develop or liberalise the financial sector, and whether 
political stability improves a country’s financial sector. In addition, we examine whether economic 
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liberalization is significant for the development of the financial sector. The questions are not trivial, 
considering the fact that liberalization increases the opportunity for banks to take on greater or more 
risks. This has led Dermiguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1999) to conclude that in countries with weak 
legal and institutional frameworks, such a lack of rule of law, high levels of corruption and weak 
contract enforcement, financial liberalization should proceed cautiously. 
The issues are more relevant given the current global financial crisis, which has directly affected the 
key drivers of the continent recent growth performance due to the fragility of their economies and 
vulnerability to external shock (Kasekende et al. 2009).  This is despite the fact that most of African 
countries implemented significant economic reforms over the last two decade, which the crisis 
threatens to unravel. Examining the role of economic and political liberalisation on financial sector 
development will help in shaping appropriate strategies for developing the financial sector African 
countries. 
This  paper adopts a two-step procedure in which we first  use  a difference in difference method to 
show the various aspect of financial liberalisation on economic and political freedom and then use 
panel data techniques from period 1990 to 2005 for a sample of 50African countries to examine the 
effect of economic and political reform. Our results show that political liberalisation, economic 
liberalisation and the stability of the political system have a statistically significant effect on 
financial development in Africa. That is, we find reforms, stability and democratic rule to be 
favourable for development of the financial sector in the continent.  
There are a few studies that directly explore the link between political and economic liberalisation 
on financial development.( See Yongfu ,2005; Olsen, 1993; Clague et al. 1996). In this paper, we 
restrict our focus to African countries only, concentrating on those where both political and 
economic reforms have taken place. Second, compared with previous papers, we consider various 
aspects of reform, including the political and economic environment as well as stability. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 is an outline of the literature review, while in section 3, 
we describe the empirical application and the data used. Section 4 presents the empirical findings, 
and section 5, summarizes the main conclusions.       
 2 . Literature Review  
 Many reasons have been put forward to explain why some countries have less sophisticated 
financial system than others.  These explanations can be divided into three interrelated strands of 
literature.  According to the first group, financial institutions do not succeed in an institutional 
vacuum, but need a legal and regulatory environment in which contracts can be enforced and 
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bankers are given strong incentives to behave honestly3.(see Kaufmann et al,1999; Demirguec-Kunt 
and Detragiache, 1999; Andrianova et al ,2003) 
 
The second school examines the link between finance and law, showing that specific types of legal 
systems are more conducive to protecting investor rights and adapting the law to take into account 
financial innovation. (See La Port et al, 1997, and 1998; Beck et al, 2001) For example, by 
comparing different broad legal traditions, namely, civil law versus common law, La Porte et. al 
find that the latter provides stronger shareholder and creditor protection on which liquid capital 
markets depend, and have a stronger enforcement tradition. 
The third strand argues that financial underdevelopment may be the outcome of political 
circumstances, protecting the interests of narrow political- industrial elite (See Rajan and Zingales, 
2003).  Such an elite may have little interest in developing a well functioning capital market, as they 
are well served by a relationship with the bankers. In such an environment, there is an absence of 
arms length finance, thus restricting the potential competitors' access to finance. The more power is 
held by the elite groups, the more autocratic the system, and the more obstacles to financial 
development. This means that political freedom, political rights and civil liberties could be crucial 
for financial development because they widen the suffrage in the political system, and limit the 
influence of an elite group’s governing policy-making. Within this approach, Pagano and Volpin 
(2001) regard regulation and its enforcement as a result of the balance of power between social and 
economic constituencies. An important dynamic implication of the political economy approach is 
that the scope of financial intermediation should increase as a broader section of the population 
achieves political representation, leading to increase access to finance and more competition 
(Perotti and Volpin, 2007).  
Further, as has been discussed by Clague et al. (1996), Olson (1993), and recently Rajan and 
Zingales (2003) dominant interest groups, especially incumbent firms and incumbent financial 
intermediaries, have strong incentives to prevent new companies from entering, potentially blocking 
the development of a more advanced financial market.  Beck et al. (2003) applied the settler 
mortality hypothesis of Acemoglu (2001) to financial development and suggested that while the 
institutions established by extractive colonizers were likely to be detrimental to financial 
development, those created by the settler colonizers tended to favour financial development. When 
the colonisers left, the post colonial elite took over the same institution and continued enjoying 
extractive surpluses. Once a political system had been set up, it brought advantages to the interest 
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groups benefiting from the system within the political process. Hence even inefficient systems were 
perpetuated, suggesting there is path dependence (see Bebchuk and Roe, 1999; Zanella et al, 2003).  
   However, a number of these studies have reported controversial outcomes. One group of studies 
found that the democratic process enhances fundamental civil rights liberties, stable politics and an 
open society, it promotes property rights protection and contract enforcement, discourages 
corruption and lawlessness, and fosters economic growth ( see Olsen, 1993, Clague et al. 199), 
Minier, 1998,  and Persson, 2005). Other studies have concluded that when the different interest 
groups are under pressure, the democratic structures may suffer from inefficiency in decision 
making and a difficulty in implementing viable policies for rapid growth. Less democratic nations 
tend to lower their economic growth rate, even resulting in economic disorder, political instability 
and ethnic conflict (Blanchard and Shleifer, 2000 and Persson and Tabellini,1992). Such processes 
are likely to be typical in African countries. In this context, it is critical to explore furthers on the 
relationship between political liberalisation or political stability and economic liberalization on 
financial development in African countries during a period  of a strong wave of democratic and 
economic reform changes taking place.  
 
3 .Data. 
The samples consist of yearly observations for about 50 African countries selected on the basis of 
data availability during the period 1990-2005. Below we discuss some of the measurement issues 
related to the variables used in the paper. These include the construction of the indices for financial 
development, political liberalisation, and economic liberalisation.  
 The financial development index 
Measuring financial development is a very complex and complicated process because there is no 
clear cut definition as to what constitutes financial development. Bandiera et al (2000) argued that 
an ideal index of financial sector development should include various aspect of regulatory and 
institutional reform. However, measuring this aspect of government policy is a very difficult if not 
impossible task (Kelly and Mavrotas, 2003). The inclusion of all the policy variables separately in 
the same model also causes serious estimation problems such as, multicolinearity, among others.  
We construct the aggregate index of financial development using the principal component analysis 
from the standard financial development indicators. In Africa these are mainly from the banking 
system, and they include liquid liabilities as percent of GDP, private sector credit as percent of GDP 
and domestic credit to banking sector as a percent of GDP. Each of the indicators above captures a 
different aspect of financial development and has its own strengths and weaknesses. In the case of 
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the banking sector development indicators, private sector credit is probably the most relevant for 
measuring opportunities for new firms or determining the ease with which any entrepreneur or 
company with a sound project can obtain finance4. Liquid liabilities measures the ability of banks to 
mobilize funds or the size of the banking system relative to the economy, but the funds are not 
always used to finance new entrepreneurs, so it may not be a suitable indicator of financial 
development in the Rajan and Zingales sense. Domestic credit comprises private credit as well as 
credit to the public sector, thus it is probably the least well suited to capturing the financial 
development index.  
The principal reason for building a composite index is to avoid the problem of multi-collinearity5 
that occurs when introducing simultaneously several financial variables that are highly correlated 
among them. The principal component and factor analysis which are methods for data reduction are 
ways that can be considered when dealing with multi-collinearity, even though there is the 
econometric theory suggesting many other procedures6 to solve the problem. For this study, we 
preferred using the principal components method because it provides many advantages. Apart from 
helping to reduce multi-collinearity, improving parsimony and improving the measurement of 
indirectly observed concepts, it makes economic sense by aiding the re-conceptualization of the 
meaning of the predictor in our regression model.   
 Using these three indicators of the banking system together, namely, liquid liabilities as percent of 
GDP, private sector credit as percent of GDP and domestic credit to banking sector as a percent of 
GDP allows us mainly to capture the size of bank based intermediation. The Financial development 
index is the first principal component of these three indicators and account for 77% of their 
variation. The weights from this procedure are 0.60 for liquid liabilities, 0.57 for private credit and 
0.55 for Domestic credit.  The data of the various variable were collected from the World Bank 
development indicator (2008) and the African Development Bank Statistics Department.  
 The political liberalisation. 
To assess whether becoming more democratic deepens financial development or whether financial 
development makes a country more democratic, two indicators were used. The first one is the 
"combined polity score" - polity2 index, which varies from 10 (strongly democratic) to -10 
(strongly autocratic), and is obtained the polity IV database (Marshall et al. 2003)7. The polity 
variable was designed to record the regime institutionalized authority characteristics. First, the 
                                                 
4
 Rajan and Zingales (2003) 
5
 Multi-collinearity refers to a situation in which two or more explanatory variables in a multiple regression model are 
highly correlated   
6
 The procedure mentioned to solve multi-collinearity were the instrumental variables. The Centring method, Omitting 
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dataset recorded a democracy score (ranging from 0 to 10) for each country, based on the openness 
of the political process, defined as the extent to which citizens can effectively express preferences 
about policies and leaders through elections and the degree of restraints on the power of the chief 
executive.  Second each country has an autocracy (again ranging from 0 to -10) based on how 
political leaders are selected (by designation or chosen from closed lists), the constraints on their 
power and the regulation and competitiveness of political participation. In this study we consider 
political liberalisation  as change from a non democratic to a democratic regime, which means that 
only democratization is considered rather than an improvement in the regime. A regime change is 
then taken to be a change from a non positive to a positive polity2 value. Countries that have 
improved their democratic process are assigned a 1 starting in the year they became a democracy 
and 0 otherwise; all other countries that have not change their process are assigned a 0.  
The second indicator is that of political instability, whose application is based on the premise that 
financial development requires a certain level of social development, trust and reputation. The 
political system that is unstable results in a loss of social and human capital, uncertainty and the 
breakdown of long term economic relationships.  Fear of confiscation due to the frequent changes 
leads people to hold physical assets instead of financial assets.  Following the annual historical 
events in each country, we were able to determine if a country had political stability (assigned a 1 
and a 0 for instability).   
The economic liberalisation index. 
To measure the quality of economic liberalisation, this paper employs the aggregate index of 
economic freedom of the Fraser institute (Gwarteny and Lawson 2007). This composite indicator, 
which draws on survey data from the Global Competitiveness Report and the International Country 
Risk Guide, measures the extent to which institutions in a country provides secure protection of 
property rights, assures fair enforcement of contracts and a stable monetary environment, allows 
free exchange with foreigners, and lifts restrictions on entry into occupation and business activities. 
It was computed for 123 countries in the base years of 1980-2005, and, by construction ranging 
from 0 to 10 implies the highest economic freedom index. In a recent paper De Haan, Lundstrom 
and Sturm (2006) compared the different measures of economic liberalisation which appeared in the 
literature. They argued that the economic freedom index periodically compiled by the Fraser 
institute has been extensively applied in empirical papers and has been proved to be the best at 
capturing the essence of market oriented institutions. 
The other index that we took into consideration was the index of capital account openness that was 
develops by Chinn and Ito (2006). They used the data reported in the Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) published by the IMF on the existence of 
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multiple exchange rates, restrictions on current and capital accounts (where the latter is measured as 
the proportion of the last five years without control) and requirement to surrender export proceeds 
in order to capture the intensity of controls on capital account transactions. Their index of openness 
is the first standardized principal component of these variables, and in practice it ranges from -2.0 in 
the case of the most control to 2.5 in the case of the most liberalisation. This data is available for 
108 countries for 1970-2000. 
The control variables are real openness which is export plus import divided by the GDP PPP, the 
GDP per capital and the growth rate of GDP, all of which are taken from the World Development 
Indicator 2008  
4. Empirical Specification. 
In this paper we used two approaches to estimate the causal effect of economic and political reform 
on financial development. The micro econometric approaches known as the difference in difference 
estimation will be first approach while the second approach is to estimate the panel regression.  
4.1. Basic Treatment Effect Model 
We followed the method used by Persson (2004), then after Giavazzi and Tabellini,(2005)  in which 
they divided the sample of country into two groups. Those countries that have experience of some 
reforms during the period of observation were called "treated" while those that had not implemented 
reforms during the same period of observation were known as "controls". For this study we looked 
at the pre- and post treatment effect on the liberalizing countries relative to the entire group. To 
identify the effect of economic or political liberalization as the estimated difference to difference of 
the financial development between the two groups of countries, we implemented the following 
equation:  
   itittiit reformy εβηα +++= (1)      
where ity  is the outcome of financial development of country i at time t; iα  and tη  are country and 
year fixed effect respectively, reform are economic and political freedom variables which are given 
the value of 1 in the year after the reform in the treated countries and 0 otherwise and itε  is an 
unobserved error term. The coefficient of β measures the effect of the reform on the variable of 
interest y. 
This method allowed us to take advantage of both the time series and the cross sectional variation in 
the data. It also useful, when studying the effect of economic or political liberalization to 
differentiate the results of the treated countries from others and also consider the pre and post 
reform consequences, exploiting both the within country variation as well as the comparison 
between countries.       
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Dynamic Analysis  
Assessing the relationship between financial development and political or economic liberalization 
in our panel data set poses some econometric issues that can be described in the context of a simple 
dynamic equation. Consider the following equation: 
                    ittiitit1itit yy εµηΖγχβα +++′+′+= − (1)        
where ity  is the dependent variable financial development index , 1ity −  is the lagged variable of the 
financial development index which has to capture the adjustment process of the dependent variable 
to the desired level, while itχ  represents the explanatory variable which is the political or economic 
liberalization variable, and itΖ  is a vector of controlling variables which comprise real openness, 
the logarithm of real GDP per capita, and the growth rate of GDP. The terms ηi and µi respectively 
denote the unobserved common factor affecting all countries, and a country effect capturing 
unobserved country characteristics.  
Using the panel data methods for the estimation allows us to control the omitted variables bias and 
endogeneity, which are better than in the case of the cross-section approach8. To solve the potential 
problem of endogeneity of the regressors9, suitable instruments are needed. We relied primarily on 
internal instruments, along the lines described by Arellano and Bond (1991). Also, when the OLS 
model is applied, the estimator of  α  is inconsistent and likely to be biased up ward since the 
lagged value of 1ity −  is positively corrected with the omitted fixed effect even if the idiosyncratic 
component of the error term is serially uncorrelated.  
The problem of the country –specific effects, can not be solved by taking the first difference of the 
equation since the first difference transformation introduces correlation between the lagged 
dependent variable and the differenced errors: 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )itit1itit'1itit2itit1itit xxyy1yy εεΖΖγβα −−+−′+−+=− −−−−      (2) 
The use of instruments is required to deal with the likely endogeneity of the explanatory variables,  
and the problem of constructing the new error term, 1t,iit −− εε , which is correlated with the lagged 
dependent variable. Assuming that the time varying disturbance ε  is not serially correlated, and the 
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explanatory variable χ  is weakly exogenous (they are uncorrelated with future realization of the 
time varying error term), lagged values of the endogenous and exogenous variables provide valid 
instruments. In other words, we assume that: 
 
  
( )[ ] 0y 1t,it,iSt,i =−⋅ −− εεε    For s ≥  2; t=3… T           (3) 
( )[ ] 01T,IT,IST,I =−⋅ =− εεχε  For s ≥  2: t=3….T           (4) 
 
We refer to the GMM estimator based on these conditions as the difference estimator. There is 
however, conceptual and statistical shortcoming with this difference estimator. When the 
explanatory variables are persistent over time, their lagged level are weak instruments for the 
regression equation in differences (Alonso-Borrego and Arellano, 1996; Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
This raises the asymptotic variance of the estimator and creates a small sample bias. To avoid these 
problems, below we use the estimation that combines the regression in difference and in levels 
(Arellano and Bover 1995, Blundell and Bond 1998). 
The instrument for the regression in differences is the same as the above. The instruments for the 
regression in levels are the lagged differences of the corresponding variables. These are appropriate 
instruments under the following additional assumption. Although there may be a correlation 
between the level of the right hand side variable and the country-specific effect in equation (2), 
there is no correlation between the difference of these variables and the country specific effect. This 
assumption results from the following stationary property: 
 
[ ] [ ]iqt,iipt,i yy ηεηε ⋅=⋅ ++  
[ ] [ ]iqT,IIPT,I XX ηεηε ⋅=⋅ ++  For all p and q               (5) 
  The additional moment conditions are: 
( ) ( )[ ] 0yy t,ii1st,ist,i =+⋅− −−− εηε  For s = 1                  (6) 
( ) ( )[ ] 0XX T,II1ST,IST,I =+⋅− −−− εηε  For s = 1            (7) 
Based on the conditions in equations 3 to 7, we employ the generalized method of moment (GMM) 
procedure to generate consistent and efficient estimates of the parameters of interest and their 
asymptotic variance- covariance (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995).   
These are given by the following formulas: 
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.yWˆW)ˆW( '1'1'' −−
∧
= ΩΧΧΩΧθ (8) 
1'1' )WˆW()(AVAR −−
∧
= ΧΩΧθ
  (9) 
 
Where θ is the vector of parameters of interest (α, β), y is the dependent variable stacked first in 
differences and then in levels, X is the explanatory-variable matrix including the lagged dependent 
variable ( χ,yit ) stacked first in differences and then in levels, Z is the matrix of instruments 
derived from the moment conditions, and Ωˆ is a consistent estimate of the variance covariance 
matrix of the moment conditions.  The consistency of the GMM estimators depends on whether 
lagged values of the explanatory variables are valid instruments in the growth regression. We 
addressed this issue by considering two specification tests suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) 
and Arellano and Bover (1995). The first is a Sargan or Hensen test of over-identifying restrictions, 
which tests the overall validity of the instruments by analyzing the sample analogy of the moment 
conditions used in the estimation process. Failure to reject the null hypothesis gives support to the 
model. The second test examines the null hypothesis that the error term itε  is not serially correlated. 
As in the case of the Sargan test, the model specification is supported when the null hypothesis is 
not rejected. In the system specification we test whether the differenced error term (that is, the 
residual of the regression in differences) is second-order serially correlated. First-order serial 
correlation of the differenced error term is expected even if the original error term (in levels) is 
uncorrelated, unless the latter follows a random walk.  The Second-order serial correlation of the 
differenced residual indicates that the original error term is serially correlated and follows a moving 
average process at least of order one. This would reject the appropriateness of the proposed 
instruments (and would call for higher-order lags to be used as instruments). 
The aim of using different methods of panel estimation (OLS, LSDV, SYS GMM), is  because the 
dynamic panel data approach suffers from serial autocorrelation and a business cycle effect which 
are inevitably introduced  when more than  one observation for each economy is added (Mankiw 
1995). It is, therefore, essential to discuss different methods of panel data model that we used before 
looking at the results. The OLS estimation of the panel data does not consider the unobserved time 
and country effects. As a result, the OLS estimation suffers from a positive correlation between the 
lagged dependent variable and the error term which affects the OLS estimation to be biased 
upwards and which can be inconsistent.10 The LSDV estimation tends to be biased downward due 
to the fact the lagged dependent variable is negatively corrected with the error term. Generally the 
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OLS and LSDV estimators can provide a bound for the turn value of the coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variable. Good estimates of the true parameter should therefore lie in the range between 
these values or at least close to it. 
 
It is a well-known concern in the literature that some of the regressors may be potentially 
endogenous or predetermined in determining financial development. For example, financial 
development of a country might improve due to a more liberalized economic system or political 
system but at the same time political and economical liberalization may be enhanced by a 
developed financial sector. If we were to run the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression , the 
estimate would be biased as the error term is correlated with Xs. 
To address the potential endogeneity of regressors and to incorporate fixed effects, we employ the 
system-GMM estimator from Blundell and Bond (1998). The Blundell-Bond estimator is arguably a 
superior approach to the Arellano-Bond difference-GMM as adding lagged differenced variables as 
instruments in the level equations may generate substantial efficiency gains when the time window 
is relatively short. Another advantage of the system-GMM estimation is its ability to identify the 
coefficients of time-invariant variables in the level equation. 
5. Results.  
 Interaction between economic and political liberalisation on financial development. 
We present the results of the treatment effect estimation between economic liberalisation, political 
liberalisation and financial development.  Table 3a reports the outcome in which the dependent 
variable is the index of financial development while the explanatory variable for economic 
liberalisation is the aggregate index of economic freedom of the Fraser institute (Gwarteny and 
Lawson 2007), giving the value of 1 for those countries that were considered treated and otherwise 
0.  The first two columns show all the countries in the sample including the treated countries while 
the last two columns represent only the treated countries, that is, those countries that experienced 
some years of reform during the period under observations. Table 3a show a positive relationship 
between financial development and economic liberalisation. The effect is more consistent with 
treated groups than the entire sample of countries. In Columns 2 and 4 we examine whether the 
timing of the reforms matters. This is accomplished by considering the liberalisation process in the 
three years preceding the reform (3year_pre_lib), three year following the reform, (3year_post_lib) 
and  from four year  and onward from the reform. Economic liberalisation seems to produce a 
positive effect on financial development from the four year period onward after the liberalisation for 
the all the countries in the sample, while for the treated group, from the three year period onward 
after reform they have a positive and significant effect on financial development.  
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Table 3b documents the effect of political liberalisation on financial development. We find that 
political freedom appears to be positive and significant on financial development when considering 
all the countries in the sample but it is not the case for all democratic countries, in which the 
coefficient is positive but not significant. The results listed in columns 2 and 4 show that the timing 
effect is negative and significant a after four year period of political reform while for the treated 
group it is positive and significant after the four year period of political reform. The timing effect 
can be interpreted as reflecting transition from  the early  to a mature stage  democratisation  . 
Table 3c shows the relationship between financial liberalisation and financial. Columns 1 and 2 
show that financial openness is consistently positive and significant, suggesting that financial 
reform do have a long run effect on the financial system. For the timing effect, the outcome for the 
treated countries is positive from the three year period onward while for all the countries in the 
sample the are some negative effects after three years of financial openness.    
When political freedom is measured by the polity2 variable (10 for strongly democratic and -10 for 
autocratic), column 1 in Table 3d shows that political liberalisation has a negative and an  
insignificant effect on financial development, while democratization undertaken five years earlier 
improves financial development. As can be seen in column 2, we also find the same effect when the 
political freedom is measured by a dummy variable (10=1 for strongly democratic and -10=0 for 
autocratic). On the other hand, the effect of economic liberalisation on financial development is 
positive and significant effect. The effect of earlier five years of economic reform is also positive 
though not significant.  
 Dynamic panel results. 
In table 4b, we present the results for the full sample of African countries obtained by OLS LSDV, 
and SYS-GMM estimation methods. The first three columns show the baseline specification (OLS) 
in which both political liberalisation variables, (dummy polity2 and polity2) are positive but not 
significant. The political stability dummy (following the political and social events of each country 
reported by polity IV dataset), however, has  a strong positive and significant effect on financial 
development. 
In column 4 to 6 we present the estimates obtained using the less square dummy variables (LSDV) 
approach, which relies on the variability of data within-country. In this context, the influence of 
various independent variables has to be understood to be taking place over time within a country, 
rather than across countries. The use of an LSDV estimator allows us to wipe out all time-invariant 
country-specific characteristics that are likely to affect the financial development patterns. 
Moreover, the use of the LSDV estimator overcomes the possible problems in data comparability 
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across countries. The result shows that the effect of political freedom on financial development is 
positive but not significant while political stability is positive and significant at a 5% level. 
We have to remember that in AR(1) models, the OLS level estimate of the autoregressive parameter 
is biased upward in the presence of a fixed effect, and the LSDV estimate is biased downward in a 
short panel. A consistent estimate of the autoregressive parameter can be expected to lie in between 
the OLS levels and LSDV estimates. It is a simple indication of the presence of serious finite 
sample biases when particular estimates fail to fall within this interval or are very close to the 
bound. 
In columns 7 to 9, the SYS-GMM estimate provides strong evidence that the improvement of 
political freedom is associated with financial developments, all the variables of political 
liberalisation and political stability are positive and significant and the diagnostic tests, including 
first order and second order serial correlation tests, the Sargan test and the different Sargan tests are 
supportive.   In general, the coefficient of log GDP per capita has a positive sign, real trade 
openness has a positive sign almost in all the estimations except with the SYS-GMM model where 
it has  a negative sign in all the estimates ( see column 7 to 9, table 4b) . 
Table 4b looks at the effect of economic liberalisation on financial development in African 
countries. It appears that the effect of economic reform on financial development was strongly 
significant during this period (1990-2005), contributing to the improvement of financial 
development. It is positive in the entire methods (OLS, LSDV and SYS-GMM) but evidence is 
clearer in the SYS-GMM model (column 5 and 6), where we find that the two variable representing 
economic liberalisation (the index of economic freedom of the Fraser institute and the index of 
capital account openness) having both positive and highly significant effects on the speed of 
financial development. In general, we find that log of GDP per capita and real trade openness have 
a positive sign and in some cases is significant while the growth rate of GDP is always negative and 
significant.  
The lagged level of the financial development index as an explanatory variable is included in all the 
regressions. The coefficient is a highly significant explanatory variable in all of the outlier robust 
regression. The positive coefficient indicates that the lagged level is picking up the unobserved 
country effect, which raises both present and past financial development. While the signs and 
coefficients of economic liberalisation variables are mostly relatively robust, the significance level 
tends to decline. An explanation for the decline in significance levels is the correlation between the 
level of financial development and economic liberalisation. Multicolinearity would tend to increase 
the standard errors of the coefficient and hence decrease the reported significance levels. In sum, 
15 
 
the main finding in this study is in accordance with the literature11, showing that improving the 
democratic process and economic liberalisation reform leads to a greater financial development 
sector.  
  
6. Conclusions.  
The purpose of this paper has been to explain the effect of political and economic liberalisation on 
financial development in Africa using a panel of 50 African countries, over the period spanning 
1990-2005. The effect of economic and political liberalisation on financial development is first 
examined using the difference-in difference approach. Finding that both financial and economic 
liberalisation improve financial development, while the association between political freedom and 
financial development is not consistent. Even when considering the effect of timing, it shows that 
after three year onward of economic liberalisation, the outcome is positive for the performance of 
the financial sector. 
Furthermore using the panel data techniques, including LSDV and SYS-GMM estimators, the paper 
points out a number of issues. First, there is a positive relationship between political freedom and 
financial development in Africa, but the evidence seems quantitatively stronger for political 
stability than political freedom. Second, the relationship between economic liberalisation and 
financial development is significantly positive, and the effect is expected to persist over a long 
period. What political and economic liberalisation has appeared to deliver in the continent is greater 
access to the international capital market, dynamic change within the financial system in most 
countries. It is, however, yet to transform the institutional setting for resource mobilisation 
sufficient to produce dynamic indigenous growth. 
In summing up, economic reform is a necessary condition for democratic development because it is 
an instrument capable of delivering the desired transformation for an economy. It opens up the 
market and unleashes popular participation in society, and can easily facilitate the convergence of 
free society and healthy financial system.  
The study therefore recommends two suggestions to enhance financial deepening through the 
liberalisation process as a means of resource mobilization for the private sector.  First, taking 
advantage of financial openness to diversify the financial instruments being offered in the financial 
market and channelling it to the private sector in these economies in order to increase 
competitivesse will enhance innovation, hence increase efficiency. Second the reform policies, 
mostly implemented under structure adjustment programs could work in a similar way as structural 
                                                 
11
 See Olsen (1993) ;Clague et al. (1996);  Huang and Temple (2005) ; F. Giavazzi and G.Tabellini (2005); 
F.Carmignani (2008);  
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reforms which can encourage the private sector so as to boost corporate governance, improve 
investment climate  and reduce corruption.  
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 Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Pair wise Correlation Coefficient. 
 
                
                  
 
                         
 
 
 
 
Variable obs Mean Std.dev Min Max 
GDP growth 718 .034 .078 -.968 .724 
Log GDP per capita 766 7.296 1.001 4.916 10.258 
Real Openness 650 .251 .154 .040 1.068 
Financial develop. index 735 4.681 1.560 -1.272 7.947 
Economic liberalisation 516 5.321 .914 2.93 7.43 
Political freedom 721 -.468 5.535 -10 10 
Capital account openness 751 -.607 1.063 -1.766 2.602 
Log Dom. Credit to private. Sector % GDP 744 2.523 .942 -.381 5.193 
Log. bank loans % GDP 741 2.382 1.055 -8.008 6.248 
Log. Liquid liabilities(M3) % GDP 749 3.256 0.702 -.185 6.625 
Log.dom. credit provide by bank sector 647 3.142 1.055 -1.685 7.135 
 Fin.dev. GDP.GR Open. Dom. 
Cred,B. 
Liq. 
Liab. 
Pri. Sect. 
Cred. 
GDPPC Pol.free. Eco.Lib. Fin.open. 
Fin. development. 1.000 - - - - - - - - - 
GDP growth -0.14*** 1.000 - - - - - - - - 
Openness 0.86** 0.053 1.000 .- - - - - - - 
Dom.credit pro. by 
bank sector 
0.87*** -0.15*** 0.07* 1.000 - - - - - - 
Liquid liabilities 0.90*** -0.13*** -
0.17*** 
0.69*** 1.000 - - - - - 
Dom. Credit to 
private sector 
0.87*** -0.09*** 0.02 0.57*** 0.74*** 1.000 - - - - 
GDP per capita 0.32*** 0.16*** 0.09** 0.19*** 0.24*** 0.36*** 1.000 - - - 
Political freedom 0.08** 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.132*** 0.12*** 0.03 1.000 - - 
Economic 
liberalisation 
0.48*** 
 
0.15*** 0.11** 0.27*** 0.44*** 0.56*** 0.41*** 0.37*** 1.000 - 
Capital account 
openness 
0.18*** -0.004 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.10*** 0.15*** 0.08 0.43*** 1.000 
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                               Difference-in-Difference estimation 
        Table 3a: Financial development and economic liberalisation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                              
 
                         Table 3b: Financial development and Political freedom 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     Notes: robust standard errors, clustered at the country level, in parentheses.*significant at 10%;** significant at 5%; significant at 1%.  
All the regressions include yearly fixed effect. 
 
 
                           
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable:  Financial development index 
 1 2 3 4 
Economic Lib. 0.94 
(0.22)*** 
 0.79 
(0.27)*** 
 
3year_pre_lib.  0.024 
(0.037) 
 0.57 
(0.039) 
3year_post_lib.  0.038 
(0.027) 
 0.57 
(0.029)* 
4year_post_lib.  0.065 
(0.027)*** 
 0.59 
(0.026)** 
     
Observations 445 322 337 322 
R_squared 0.32 0.05 0.24 0.05 
Sample ALL ALL Treated Treated 
  Dependent Variable:  Financial development index 
 1 2 3 4 
Political lib. 0.026 
(0.011)** 
 0.015 
(0.011) 
 
3year_pre_lib.  0.045 
(0.034) 
 -0. 03 
(0.023) 
3year_post_lib.  0.031 
(0.023) 
 0.0004 
(0.017) 
4year_post_lib.  -0. 106 
(0.056)* 
 0.45 
(0.019)** 
     
Observations  603 569 307 377 
R_squared 0.02 0.06 0.08 0.10 
Sample  ALL ALL Treated Treated 
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                               Table 3c. Financial development and Capital Account Openness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     3d. - Financial development , Political freedom and Economic liberalisation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                          
   
                                           Notes: robust standard errors, clustered at the country level, in parentheses.*significant at 10%;** significant at 5%; significant at 1%.  
                                         All the regressions include yearly fixed effect 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
. 
                                       
 
 
     
  Dependent Variable:  Financial development index 
 1 2 3 4 
Financial Lib.   0.23 
(0.047)*** 
 0.29 
(0.102)*** 
 
3year_pre_lib.  1.24 
(1.01) 
        -1. 53 
(0.46)** 
3year_post_lib.  -1. 75 
(1.01)* 
 0.24 
(0.087)** 
4year_post_lib.  0.17 
(0.203) 
 0.56 
(0.22)* 
     
Observations  634 376 309 322 
R_squared 0.04 0.12 0.08 0.05 
Sample  ALL ALL Treated Treated 
  1  2  3 
Real Openness   0.665 
(1.396) 
 
 
 
0.732 
(1.434) 
 
 
-1.475 
(1.791) 
GDP growth  -3.981* 
(2.257) 
 
 
 
-3.855* 
(2.248) 
 
 
-0.965 
(1.785) 
Log GDP per capita  0.630* 
(0.320) 
 
 
 
0.637** 
(0.312) 
 
 
1.004** 
(0.371) 
Political freedom  -0.290 
(0.373) 
 
 
-0.035 
(0.036) 
 
 
 
Political freedom_5  1.045* 
(0.530) 
 
 
1.118** 
(0.512) 
 
 
 
Economic liberalisation      0.587 
(0.242)** 
Economic liberalisation_5      0.319 
(0.464) 
   
Observations 554 553 395 
Number of Countries 40 40 30 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.266 0.274 0.414 
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Dynamic Analysis   
 
 
Table 4a: Effect of Economic liberalisation on financial development in African countries 
             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%;***significant at 1%.. 
 
                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
               
.    
    
Dependent variable: FD              OLS             LSDV     SYS-GMM   
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
       
FD_1 0.973*** 
(0.008) 
0.980*** 
(0.007) 
0.670*** 
(0.030) 
0.731*** 
(0.024) 
0.649*** 
(0.081) 
0.88*** 
(0.086) 
Real Openness 0.109 
(0.129) 
0.088 
(0.077) 
0.364 
(0.364) 
0.131 
(0.570) 
0.324 
(1.747) 
0.162 
(0.184) 
Log GDP per capita 0.001 
(0.017) 
0.015 
(0.016) 
0.250** 
(0.127) 
0.368 
(0.015) 
0.328* 
(0.171) 
0.067 
(0.069) 
GDP growth -0.633*** 
(0.221) 
-0.689*** 
(0.006) 
-0.952*** 
(0.212) 
-0.068*** 
(0.225) 
-1.17* 
(0.662) 
-1.937*** 
(0.624) 
Economic freedom 0.045*** 
(0.016) 
 0.067*** 
(0.023) 
 0.121* 
(0.052) 
 
Capital account openness  0.016** 
(0.006) 
 0.0162** 
(0.006) 
 0.0805** 
(0.035) 
       
AR2(p-value)     0.178 0.896 
Hansen(p-value)     0.796 0.224 
Adjusted R-squared 0,97 0,97     
Number of countries 31 42 31 42 31 42 
Observations 397 581 397 581 379 542 
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Table 4b: Effect of political freedom and stability on financial development in African countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
   
Dependent variable: Fin.Dev. OLS LSDV SYS-GMM                              
 1 2 3  4 5 6 7 8 9 
FD_1 0.979*** 
(0.007) 
0.980*** 
(0.007) 
0.977*** 
(0.007) 
 
 
0.716*** 
(0.025) 
0.719*** 
(0.026) 
0.728*** 
(0.024) 
0.966*** 
(0.077) 
0.99*** 
(0.071) 
0.977*** 
(0.065) 
Real Openness 0.071 
(0.097) 
0.095 
(0.097) 
0.112 
(0.084) 
 
 
0.648* 
(0.345) 
0.685** 
(0.349) 
0.310 
(0.233) 
-1.412 
(0.943) 
-0.82* 
(0.427) 
-0.163 
(0.204) 
Log GDP per capita 0.016 
(0.016) 
0.009 
(0.014) 
0.0174 
(0.014) 
 
 
0.411*** 
(0.108) 
0.225** 
(0.109) 
0.146 
(0.105) 
0.375 
(0.178)** 
0.20** 
(0.72) 
0.011 
(0.052) 
GDP growth -0.584*** 
(0.238) 
-0.636*** 
(0.194) 
-0.623*** 
(0.182) 
 
 
-0.928*** 
(0.189) 
-0.952*** 
(0.189) 
-0.893*** 
(0.186) 
-1.90*** 
(0.597) 
-0.99* 
(0.232) 
-1.565*** 
(0.460) 
Political freedom (dummy) 0.035 
(0.021) 
   0.023 
(0.036) 
  0.026 
(0.12)** 
 
  
Political freedom ( polity2)  0.002 
(.001) 
   0.001 
(0.003) 
  0.33* 
(0.183) 
 
Political stability   0.049* 
(0.029) 
 
 
  0.103** 
(0.040) 
  0.399*** 
(0.126) 
           
AR2(p-value)        0.706 0.734 0.764 
Hansen(p-value)        0.739 0.634 0.522 
Adjusted R-squared 0.976 0.975 0.975  0.97 0.99 0.998    
Number of countries 40 40 48  40 40 48 39 40 41 
Observations 548 547 579  548 547 579 509 514 539 
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     Figure1. Financial development and economic liberalisation index 
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       Figure 2. Financial development and Political Liberalisation index 
 
 
 
26 
 
AGO
BDI
BENBFA
CAF
CIV
CMR
COG
COM
CPV
DZA
EGY
ERI
ETH
GAB
GHA GMB
GNB
GNQ
KEN
LSO
MAR
MDGMLI
MOZ
MRT
MUS
MWI
NAM
NER
NGA
RWA
SDN
SEN
SLE
SWZ
SYC
TCD
TGO
TUN
TZA
UGA
ZAF
ZMB
3
4
5
6
7
8
-1 0 1 2
(mean) kaopen
(mean) fin_index Fitted values
 
     Figure 3. Financial development and index of capital account openness  
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Fig.4. Financial development index in various African countries, 1990-2005  
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 
 
0 50 100 150 200
Liquid liabilities (M3) % GDP
ZMB
ZAR
ZAF
UGA
TZA
TUN
TGO
TCD
SYC
SWZ
SLE
SEN
SDN
RWA
NGA
NER
NAM
MWI
MUS
MRT
MOZ
MLI
MDG
MAR
LSO
LBR
KEN
GNQ
GNB
GMB
GIN
GHA
GAB
ETH
ERI
EGY
DZA
CPV
COM
COG
CMR
CIV
CAF
BWA
BFA
BEN
BDI
AGO
 
 
0 50 100 150
Domestic credits to pirvate sector (% GDP)
ZMB
ZAR
ZAF
UGA
TZA
TUN
TGO
TCD
SYC
SWZ
SLE
SEN
SDN
RWA
NGA
NER
NAM
MWI
MUS
MRT
MOZ
MLI
MDG
MAR
LSO
LBR
KEN
GNQ
GNB
GMB
GIN
GHA
GAB
ETH
ERI
EGY
DZA
CPV
COM
COG
CMR
CIV
CAF
BWA
BFA
BEN
BDI
AGO
 
    Figure 5. The average domestic credits to private sector (% GDP) and liquid Liailities (%GDP) 1990-2005   
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                                                     Appendix 
 
 
 Econ. liberalisation Political freedom Financial openness  
Countries Control  Treated  Control Treated Control Treated 
Angola yes no yes no yes no 
Benin no yes no yes yes no 
Botswana no yes no yes yes no 
Burkina Faso no yes no yes yes no 
Burundi no yes no yes yes no 
Cameroon no yes yes no yes no 
Cape Verde no yes yes no yes no 
Cent, Africa no yes yes no yes no 
Chad yes  yes no yes no 
Comoros - - no yes yes no 
Congo Dem. yes  yes no yes no 
Congo Rep. yes  yes no yes no 
Cote d’lvoire no yes yes no no yes 
Equat. Guinea - - yes no yes no 
Eritrea - - yes no yes no 
Ethiopia no yes no yes yes no 
Gabon  no yes yes  no yes no 
Gambia - - no yes yes no 
Ghana  no yes no yes no yes 
Guinea  - - yes no yes no 
Guinea Bissau  - - no yes yes no 
Kenya no yes no yes no yes 
Lesotho  no yes no yes no yes 
Liberia  - - no yes yes no 
Madagascar  no yes yes no yes no 
Malawi yes  no yes yes no 
Mali no yes no yes yes no 
Mauritania  no yes yes no yes no 
Mauritius  no yes no yes yes no 
Mozambique  no yes no yes no yes 
Namibia  no yes no yes yes no 
Niger no yes no yes yes no 
Nigeria  no yes no yes yes no 
Rwanda  no yes yes no yes no 
Senegal no yes no yes yes no 
Seychelles  - - yes no yes no 
Sierra Leone  no yes no yes yes no 
South Africa  no yes no yes yes no 
Sudan  - - yes no yes no 
Swaziland  - - yes no no yes 
Tanzania  no yes no yes yes no 
Togo  - - yes no yes no 
Uganda  no yes yes no yes no 
Zambia  no yes yes no yes no 
Algeria  yes  yes no yes no 
Egypt  no yes yes no no yes 
Morocco  no yes yes no yes no 
Tunisia  no yes yes 
 
no no 
 
yes 
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